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I. HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Ohio was among the earliest of the American states to consider and
enact juvenile court legislation.' Although Illinois enacted the first
juvenile law in 1899,2 the doctrine of parens patriae was used to justify
commitment of children as early as 1839 in Pennsylvania3 and 1869 in
Ohio.4 Earlier individualized treatment for young criminals dates back to
1825 when New York established a House of Refuge, 5 and to 1830 when
probation was used as a substitute for institutionalization.'
Parens patriae may originally have been thought to extend state
control only to orphaned children, dependent children and incompetent
persons.7 The class was easily extended by proponents of the juvenile
court movement to incorrigibles and law breaking children. The
extension was justified by the theory that the state was the ultimate
guardian of children and could intervene in the interests of good
citizenship.8
It is likely that chancery jurisdiction was originally restricted to cases
involving the aristocracy to protect the feudal system rather than the
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law, B.A., J.D., University of
Nebraska, L.L.M., New York University. Member, Attorney General's Juvenile Justice Task Force.
1. 95 OHIo LAws 785 (1902) (Act establishing the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court). Legisla-
tion of 1906 extended the concept statewide. 98 Omo LAws 314 (1906). Columbus established a
juvenile court in 1904 and Cincinnati established one in 1908. See A. PLATvr, THE CHILD SA\TRS 139
(1969); Harpst, Practice in Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 507 (1961);
Young, A Synopsis of Ohio Juvenile Court Law, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 131,135 (1962).
2. 1899 ILL. LAWS 131. By 1917 46 states, the District of Columbia, England, Portugal,
Belgium, France, Hungary, Germany, and Switzerland had followed. The Scandinavian countries
substituted administrative boards to accomplish the same thing. See 0. NYQuisT, JUVENiLE JL'SrtCE
124 (1960); A. PLAT, THE CHILD SAVERS 9 (1969).
3. Exparte Crouse, 4Whart 9 (Pa. 1839). In Crouse, the court described the House of Refuge
as reform oriented and justified commitment of children by asking: "To this end may not the natural
parents, when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy of it, be superseded by theparenspatriae,
or common guardian of the community?" Id. at 11.
4. Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184 (1869). See House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197,204
(1881) (court described the authority of the state asparenspatriae as unquestioned); Whitlatch, The
Juvenile Court-A Court ofLaw, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (1967).
5. See, H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNrrED STATES 16 (1927).
6. Id. at 17.
7. See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY AND F. SANDERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LA, 394 n.13
(1966); BALLENTINE'S LAW DICToNARY 811 (2d ed. 1969); Cogan, Juvenile Law Before and After the
Entrance of"Parens Patriae," 22 S. C. L. REv. 147 (1970); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery
to the Juvenile Court, 23 S. C. L. REv. 205 (1971).
8. See Mick, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909); Rendleman, supra note7, at219.
Rendleman notes: "In 18th century Virginia the local officials could bind out as apprentices the
children of parents who were poor, not providing 'good breeding, neglecting their formal education,
not teaching a trade, or were idle, dissolute, unchristian or'uncapable.'" Id. at 212.
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children, and that our original resort to the parens patriae doctrine was
misplaced.9 Nevertheless, it is fair to admit that poor laws were enacted by
1562, that a fully developed statutory scheme had been created that
allowed the crown to take children of pauper parents and apprentice those
children to others,' 0 and that our first states had enacted similar laws as an
integral part of the social order." Thus, the doctrine ofparenspatriae was
first used within chancery to justify state intervention to protect the feudal
system; then outside chancery to justify poor laws and to give the state
jurisdiction over misbehaving children. Finally, the doctrine was used to
justify separate treatment for juvenile criminals and the extension of state
jurisdiction over potential criminals or delinquent3.
Because this theory of protective custody over children was thought
benevolent, 2 the child savers 13 were prepared to offer it as a replacement
for criminal trials, incarceration and punishment, and as an alternative for
poorhouse commitment. Consequently, orphanages and reformatories
accompanied this movement toward more benevolent juvenile court
procedure.14  No matter what the particular issue, courts referred to
parens patriae to justify ultimate state control over children and to avoid
procedural niceties that usually accompanied civil or criminal commit-
ment proceedings.15 The use of the doctrine to justify relaxed procedural
rules has recently been litigated in the United States Supreme Court and
found wanting.
16
The Supreme Court decisions undoubtedly precipitated the Ohio
Juvenile Code revisions that were enacted in 1969, but for the most part
those revisions were limited to bringing Ohio into compliance with the
9. Shelley v. Westerbrook, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817); Wellesl.y v. the Duke of Beaufort, 38
Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827); Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (H.L. 1828). These cases are cited
in Rendleman, supra note 7, at 208. He points out that unlimited chancery jurisdiction was
inconsistent with our concept of limited constitutional government. Moreover, it was never extended
to the poor citizenry.
10. Statutes of Artificers, 5 Eliz. 4 (1562). The Poor Law Act of 1601, 43 Eliz. 2 (1601). See
Rendleman, supra note 7, at 210.
11. See JERRIGAN, THE LABORING AND DEPENDENT CLASSES IN COLONIAL AMIERICA (1960);
Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CALIF. L, Rtv. 175 (1955),
12. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928); (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted):
Experience should teach us to be most on ourguard to protect liberty when the Government's
purposes are beneficient. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
13. See A. PLATT, supra note 1; Platt, The Rise ofthe ChildSaving Movement:A Stud'vln Social
Policy and Correctional Reform, 381 THE ANNALS 21 (1969).
14. A. PLATT, supra note I at 146: "The passage of the Illinois juvenile court act in 1899
prompted a flood of optimistic rhetoric . . . .The Act, however, did little to change the quality
of institutional life .... "
15. See Rendleman, supra note 7, at 245-47.
16. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966).
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recently announced constitutional requirements.17  The 1969 revisions
failed to address treatment issues,18 restrict jurisdiction over delinquent
20
children' 9 as had been recommended, or eliminate commitment of status
offenders to Ohio Youth Commission institutions.21 After the 1969 Code
revisions, the Ohio Supreme Court promulgated Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, which became effective on July 1, 1972. These Rules brought
Ohio into conformity with procedural cicepts previously mandated by
the Supreme Court of the United States.22 Although the rules have been
amended 23 they also do not address crucial issues relating to juvenile crime
and treatment.24
II. THE PROPOSED OHIO JUVENILE CODE OF 1977-1978
The purpose of this article is to assess the correctional potential of
pending Ohio juvenile reform legislation by comparing it with federal
legislation and various investigative studies. A factor in the equation of
Ohio juvenile justice reform is the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
17. See generally Willey, Ohio's Post-GaultJuvenile Court Law, 3 AKRO.x L. Ray. 152(1970).
18. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.355(E) (Page 1976). This statute provided that a
child might be committed to the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. At the time this
section was enacted the only institution that housed juveniles was the Ohio State Reformatory.
Commitment to the Ohio State Reformatory had been rejected in Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St.
475, 196 N.E.2d 457(1964); In re Agler, 15 Ohio App. 2d240,240N.E.2d874(Defiance County 1968),
rev'd, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70 (1969). Despite these two cases, the 1969 Revisions continued the possiblity
thatjuveniles could be committed to maximum security penal institutions for adult criminal offenders.
19. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.02 (Page 1976), as enacted in 1969, included Section A of§
2151.02. All the other sections of old § 2151.02 were included in a new section describing the unruly
child and numbered § 2151.022. In addition, the new § 2151.02 enacted in 1969 included: "(B) Who
violates any lawful order of the court made in this chapter."
20. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTjCE TAsK
FORCE REPORT- JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 23 (1967).
21. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.354 (Page 1976) allowsanydisposition available for neglected
children, OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. § 2151.353 (Page 1976), probation, suspension of driving privileges,
and, under certain circumstances, any disposition authorized for delinquent children. Id.§2151.355.
See 72 OHIO Op. ATTY. GEN. 71 (1972), which concluded that any construction of § 2151.354 that
would allow commitment of an"unruly" child to the Ohio Youth Commission would beaviolatonof
due process of law, and therefore an improper construction. Since many unruly children are chronic
behavior problems and likely to violate one of the conditions of probation, it is also possible to proceed
against them under § 2151.02(B) as delinquent, and justify their commitment as delinquent children
rather than as unruly children. Section 2151.02(B) is currently used to justify commitment of status
offenders.
22. As adopted, JUVENILE RULE 29(E)(4), required the"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of
proof for all juvenile traffic and delinquency proceedings. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page
1976) only required the"clear and convincing evidence" standard be used. Inre Winship.397 U.S. 358
(1970) had been decided during the interim and required the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
For a pre-Winship discussion of this burden of proof problem, see Willey, supra note 17 at 181-83.
23. Juv. R. 29(E)(4), as amended, requires a "beyond a reasonable doubt standard" in unruly
cases as well.
24. OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S JUVENILE JusTIcE TAK FORCE, Jusrnc Fox Ouo CniLDRm iv
(December 1976) [hereinafter cited as OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT]. The preface by Attorney General
Brown, cited an 1834 report which blamed three-fourths of all crime on children and the decay of the
family;, an 1866 Massachusetts report condemning use of reformatories and recommending use of
cheaper and better foster homes; and an 1875 report condemning use ofjails for children. He pointed
out that we had all those problems or were still doing all those things in Ohio in 1976. rd.
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Prevention Act of 1974 [hereinafter called the Federal Act] which provides
some federal funds for states that comply with its requirements.23 The
Federal Act becomes important because it emphasizes community-based
programs for delinquency prevention and treatment, 26 diversion of
juveniles from juvenile court,27 and noncommitment of status offenders. 28
In addition, the Federal Act prohibits the continued use of adult jails for
holding alleged or adjudicated delinquents.29
Under the Federal Act, each participating state is required to submit a
plan substantiating the implementation of its provisions.3" By December
1975, Ohio had done nothing to comply with this requirement. Attorney
General William G. Brown independently constituted a Task Force On
Juvenile Justice in January of 1976 to study juvenile crime in Ohio. The
efforts of the Task Force culminated in a report [hereinafter called the
Task Force Report] dated December 1976,"' and House Bill No. 460. An
amended form, Substitute House Bill 460 is presently under consideration
in the Ohio General Assembly.3 2  By January 1977, the Ohio Juvenile
Justice Advisory Committee appointed by Governor James A. Rhodes
published a Draft Proposal for Goals and Standards [hereinafter called
OJJAC Standards] for juvenile justice as a first step toward Federal Act
compliance.33
In addition, two national studies were completed in 1977. The
National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
issued its report presenting Standards for Juvenile Justice [hereinafter
called the LEAA Standards].34 The Institute of Judicial Administration
and the American Bar Association [hereinafter called the IJA-ABA
Standards]35 also published its conclusions.
Thus, the Federal Act, the Task Force Report, the OJJAC, LEAA,
25. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (Supp. 1975).
See also OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 56-57.
26. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5634(a)(2) (Supp.
1975).
27. Id. § 5633(a)(10).
28. Id. § 5633(a)(12).
29. Id. § 5633(a)(13).
30. Id. § 5633.
31. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
32. Sub. H.B. 460, as amended, was unanimously passed by the Ohio House Judiciary
Committee on March 9, 1978, and by the Ohio House of Representatives on March 23, 1978.
33. OHIO JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DRAFT GOALS AND STANDARDS FOR JU-
VENILE JUSTICE IN OHIO (January 1977) [hereinafter cited as OJJAC STANDARDS].
34. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVENILL
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (1976) [hereinafter cited as LEAA STANDARDS]. The LEAA
Standards are presented in one large volume of twenty-eight chapters, were dated December 1976 and
became available to the public in 1977.
35. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOINT COMMISSION
ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT (Tent. Draft 1977)
[hereinafter cited as IJA-ABA STANDARDS]. The IJA-ABA Standards are presented in twenty-three
volumes along with a separate summary and analysis.
[Vol. 39:273
OHIO JUVENILE CODE
and IJA-ABA Standards established juvenile justice reform requirements
against which the pending Ohio legislation can be measured. Although
this article addresses the correctional potential of the bill, it will not
consider the Children's Bill of Rights36 or deinstitutionalization of status
offenders provisions.37
Preliminary to a section-by-section analysis of House Bill 460, a brief
statement on the rationale, long-range goals and immediate priorities of
the Task Force is appropriate. A basic rationale adopted by the Task
Force was the protection of juvenile rights and dignity. The Task Force
also recognized the necessity of providing children with vital services. 8 In
view of the budgetary limits of the juvenile system, theTask Force realized
that reform of the existing system would probably occur through more
efficient use of currently allocated resources. Despite the budgetary
considerations, the Attorney General requested study of reform alterna-
tives, acknowledged some alternatives would be essential, and admitted
additional resources might be needed to make the system less wasteful,
more beneficial and less arbitrary.39 Given the national political posture
on crime and delinquency, however, most members of the Task Force
concluded that to achieve needed juvenilejustice reform, costly unproven
new programs should not be suggested.4°
The Task Force decided that a long range goal must be to consolidate
children's services within a single agency. 41 During the Task Force
investigation, evidence established that youth services are administered by
many agencies. Because of this organization, some children who need
services from more than one agency will not get services from any. The
Task Force would insure that no child would be denied services because of
a dispute between agencies concerning which agency would be ultimately
responsible for payment of services ordered.
The second long-range goal of the Task Force was deemphasis of
institutionalization and reallocation of resources to community treatment
programs.42  Evidence supports movement from state institutional
36. H.B. 460, 112th Gen. Ass. § 2151.02 (1977-78) [hereafter cited as H.B. 460]. The Children's
Bill of Rights was not included in Sub. H.B. 460.
37. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.40.
38. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 2.
39. Id.
40. See OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at iv. Attorney General Brown informed the
Task Force that juvenile institutional costs has grown 1400 in 20 years and 500%,,o over the last decade.
The Attorney General also noted this was paralleled by a similar increase in crime.
41. OHIo TAK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 3, 101. H.B. No. 460 does not include any
provisions for such governmental reform.
42. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 3,88. See H.B.460,supra note36, §§2152.01-
.14,5139.03(J), 5139.27. See also Sub. H.B. 460, l12th Gen. Ass. § 5139.03(B) (1977-78) [hereinafter
cited as Sub. H.B. 460]. Sub. S.B. 460, § 5139.03(B) limits Ohio Youth Commission institutional
population to 200; and establishes minimum standards for facilities, programs, personnel, operation
and education. The substance covered in the original bill is adequately covered in the Sub. H.B. 460
provisions, except for the explicit direction of H.B. 460, § 51.39.03(J) to Ohio Youth Commission to
reallocate funds from Fairfield to community programs.
1978]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
correction programs to smaller community oriented treatment centers.43
Studies have consistently indicated that large state institutions do not
reform, but increase the likelihood that one committed to them will violate
the law in the future.44 While some juveniles do present a danger to
society, testimony was given in 1976 that only 41441 children at Youth
Commission institutions had committed a violent crime.46 In addition,
modern studies acknowledge that community programs achieve better
results than state institutions.47 Fiscal management also supports the
movement toward community treatment programs: community treatment
costs approximately 25% of the $13,000 per child per year that Ohio
currently spends at its least costly Ohio Youth Commission institution.48
The Task Force identified two short-range goals: closing Fairfield
School for Boys and reforming the Ohio Juvenile Code. The Task Force
conducted an extensive investigation of Fairfield ,49 and although this
subject could easily accommodate a separate article, the results of that
investigation must be summarized for this work. The Task Force
investigation revealed Fairfield was horribly overcrowded and physically
43. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 18; IJA-AFIA STANDARDS, CORRL"rION
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 25, at 109; LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, at 673, and OJJAC
STANDARDS, supra note 33, at 60. The unanimous thrust of the recomnendations is towards the least
disruptive disposition for each juvenile. Hence, all agree the utilization of community facilities and
programs should receive first priority. See also OHIO CITIZENS' TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, FINAL
REPORT OF THE OHIO CITIZENS' TASK FORCE AI-A29, A5 (1971). The report concludes that all phases
of institutional corrections are inadequate and institutions can only be justified on a community
protection basis. Since institutionalization has a negative effect on mo:.t inmates after a short period
of incarceration, "wherever possible alternatives to incarceration must be found." The Ohio Citizens'
Task Force recommends development of a system of community-based corrections.
44. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 9; Winter, Downs & Hall, JUVENILH
CORRECTIONS IN THE STATES: RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS AND DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION A PRELIMINARY
REPORT, 1-80 (National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, The University of Michigan, November
1975); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TIlE CIIAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY ch. 6 (1967).
45. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 30 n.4. Total Youth Commission population
ranges from 2257 (the number of beds available) to 3000.
Institutions Capacity
Buckeye Youth Center (1) 200 (Boys: 144, Girls: 56)
Child Study Center (1) 100
Cuyahoga Hills Boys School (2) 200
Fairfield School for Boys 650
Indian River School (4) 192
Maymee Youth Camp (5) 120
Mohican Youth Camp (6) 120
Riverview School for Girls (7) 152
Scioto Village Girls School (7) 227
Training Center for Youth (1) 104
Training Institution, Central Ohio (1) 192
46. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 18 (1967).
47. See generally material cited note 43 supra.
48. See OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note24, at 46. It was also estimated that 1977 cost per
bed at Fairfield would approximate $15,000, and that it would rise to a! much as $17,000 per bed by
1979.
49. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 65-79.
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delapidated below humane standards. 0 The Fairfield staff, program and
forms of punishment created an atmosphere of hostility;5t consequently,
security was maintained through a program of extreme regimentation. 2
The Task Force concluded Fairfield's architecture and physical condition
were inconsistent with the potential for treatment.53 In other words,
commitment to Fairfield could not be defended upon any premise used to
justify a separate juvenile court system.54
Although original House Bill 460 effectively closed Fairfield,55 the
amended bill merely limits the population of Youth Commission
institutions.56 If Fairfield were completely shut down, funds would be
available to initiate a movement towards community treatment programs.
Without the closure of Fairfield, changes designed to improve juvenile
treatment through community programs would require additional
legislative appropriations. Under present circumstances, it is doubtful the
necessary funds would be appropriated.
A. Statutory Provisions Addressing Specific Goals
of the Task Force
The second short-range goal of the Task Force was to reform the
existing Ohio Juvenile Code. The proposed legislation reflects priorities
identified by the Task Force that are crucial for achieving reform. During
the drafting stages of this legislation, the Task Force also considered
federal requirements to enable Ohio to receive federal funding. Bearing in
mind the purpose of this article, the comparative analysis of the Ohio Bill,
this author will now delve into the provisions of the 1977-1978 proposed
Ohio Juvenile Code that address juvenile correction and treatment.
1. Prohibition on Commitment of Status Offenders
Ohio currently needs to eliminate statutory provisions that allow
50. Id. at 65-68.
51. Id. at 69-71.
52. Id. at 75-77.
53. Id. at 68.
54. See also Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1909); Oto TAsr FORcE REPOitT,
supra note 24, at 65-79.
55. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 5139.03:
(D) The Fairfield School for Boys shall within ninety days of the effective date of this
section have an inmate population of not more than six hundred inmates. Within one
hundred eighty days of the effective date of this section, the Fairfield School for Boys shall
have a population of not more than than two hundred inmates.
(E) Within two years of the effective date of this section, the Fairfield School for Boys
shall cease operation as a state facility for the residential treatment or custody of juveniles
committed to the Youth Commission.
(F) Upon cessation of use as state juvenile correctional facility, all buildings designated
as dormitories constructed prior to 1927 shall be razed.
56. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 5139.03(B): "Any institution or facility that is subject to the
control and management of the Youth Commission shall not have award population in excess of two
hundred individuals at any one time."
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commitment of status offenders to state correctional institutions and
detention of juveniles in county jails.5 7  Section 2151.02(B) of the Ohio
Revised Code authorizes a juvenile court to adjudicate as delinquent an
unruly child who violates an order of probation. 8 Section 2151.354
allows the juvenile court to treat some unruly children who do not violate
any court order as if they were delinquent.5 9 To eliminate commitment of
status offenders to the Youth Commission, both of these statutes must be
repealed. Neither section appears in House Bill 460 or the substitute bill,
Substitute House Bill 460.60
The proposed legislation significantly limits placement of unruly
children in nonsecure programs.61  Except for children who violate
probation or who fail to remain in a nonsecure treatment program,
juveniles cannot be committed to a secure treatment program for more
than thirty days.62 However, the proposed section of House Bill 460 that
57. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(2), (13) (Supp. 1974). See OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at
46. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, ARCHITECTURE OF FACILITIES, supra note 35, STANDARD 5.3 limits
commitment to secure facilities of adjudicated delinquents; OJJAC STANDARDS, supra note 33,
STANDARD 13.2 provides: "[S]tatus offenders . . . should not be committed to the Ohio Youth
Commission; and LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, at 311 abolish the traditional status offense, and
subsume the topic under Chapter 10 that defines "Families with Service Needs."
58. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.02(B) (Page 1976): "Who violates any lawful order of the court
made under this chapter." See Willey, supra note 17, at 161; OHIo TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24,
at 48. This section is the reason the Ohio Youth Commission shows few unruly child commitments, and
yet is castigated for housing up to 20 percent status offenders.
59. OHIO REv. CODEANN. § 2151.354(Page 1976). The last paragraph reads as follows: "Ifafter
making such disposition the court finds, upon further hearing, that the child is not amenable to
treatment or rehabilitation under such disposition, the court may make a disposition otherwise
authorized under section 2151.355 of the Revised Code." See OHIo TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note
24, at 47; "Any construction of Section 3151.354, Ohio Revised Code, that would allow commitment of
an 'unruly child to the legal custody of the Ohio Youth Commission would be a violation of due process
of law, and therefore an improper construction." Willey, supra note 17,at 165-66;72011[oOP.A'Y.
GEN. 71 (1972).
60. Sub. 1.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.24:
As used in Chapter2151 of tfie Ohio Revised Code, "delinquent child" includes any child who
commits a violation of any law of this state, any law of the United States, or any ordinance or
regulation of a political subdivision of the state, which violation would be a crime if
committed by an adult, except as provided in Division (B)(21) of Section 2151.02 of the
Revised Code.
Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.27(E):
(1) Place the child on probation under any terms that the court prescribes, including, but
not limited to, the performance ofcommunity service work for health districts, park districts,
counties, municipal corporations, townships and other subdivisions of state or local
government that are reasonably near the location at which the unruly act was committed or
the domicile of the child;
(2) Suspend or revoke the operator's license that was issued to the child, or suspend or
revoke the registration of all motor vehicles that are registered in the child's name;
(3) Commit the child in a nonsecure treatment program operat.:d by a public or private
organization for a period not to exceed one year, which commitment cannot be renewed
pursuant to Division (F) of this section;
(4) If the child violates probation or fails as a result of his intentional acts to remain In a
program to which he is committed pursuant to Division (3) of this section, the court, after a
hearing, may commit the child to a secure treatment program for up to thirty days.
61. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.26(eX3).
62. Id.
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prohibited commitment to a secure program more than once, even though
the child continued his violations, does not appear in Substitute House Bill
460.63
2. Minimum Age for Ohio Youth Commission Commitment
Although there is no minimum age specified for adjudication of
unruly or delinquent children, the proposed Ohio Code has finally
established a minimum age of twelve years before a delinquent child can be
committed to a secure treatment program, or to certain institutions such as
those of the Ohio Youth Commission.64 It is hoped that a minimum age
will be included within the unruly child sections; at the present time, unruly
children can be committed to secure facilities for thirty days and to
nonsecure facilities for ninety days.65
Another problem with the existing Ohio Juvenile Code is that once a
court assumes jurisdiction over a child, it may retain jurisdiction over that
child until he is twenty-one. For example, a thirteen-year old was recently
detained for assaulting a school teacher. It was proved the teacher had
unjustly attacked him and that the minor had been acting in self-defense.
The complaint was dismissed. The court discovered the youth had been
adjudicated delinquent two years earlier. The court therefore claimed
jurisdiction over the child, and ordered the child into a residential school in
another city. House Bill 460 originally provided that jurisdiction over an
unruly child ceases one year after the adjudication date." Substitute
63. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.47(E):
If a child is adjudged unruly as defined in Division (A) of Section 2151.40 [truant from home
or school] of the Revised Code, the court may commit the child to a secure treatment facility
within the county, or, if the county is a member of a treatment facility district as provided
under sections 2151.01 to 2152.99 of the Revised Code to a secure treatment facility within the
district for not more than thirty days, ifthere is probable cause to believe that the child would
not remain in a nonsecure treatment program regardless of the existence of an order of
disposition requiring him to do so. Ifa disposition pursuant to this division has previously
been ordered in a case, no further disposition pursuant to this division shall be ordered.
64. OHIO TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 5. See H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.57(J)
which imposes the minimum age limits on those delinquent children who might be committed under
H.B. 460 § 2151.57(C) (D) or(E). Currently, Ohio Revised Code § 5139.05(A) (Page 1971) provides:
"The juvenile court may commit any child to the Youth Commission . . .provided that any child so
committed shall be at leasttwelveyearsofage...." HA-ABASTANDARDS, JuvFNILEDELL;QuE.-'CY
AND SANCTIONs, supra note 35, STANDARD 2.1 provides for a minimum age often beforejurisdiction
attaches.
65. H.B.460,supranote36, §2151.47(C),(E). UA-ABASTANDARDs, DISPosro.Nssupra note
35, STANDARD 3.3 (E): "(I) Nonsecure residence. No court should sentence a juvenile to reside in a
nonsecure residence unless thejuvenile is at least ten years old... .(2Xb) No court should sentence ajuvenile to confinement in a secure facility unless the juvenile is at least twelve years old .. ." Sub.
H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.51(B) provides financial assistance to certain local rehabilitation
facilities for delinquent children only if they restrict treatment to those over twelve. Sub. H.B. 460,
supra note 42, § 2151.52(B) provides financial assistance to detention facilities used for rehabilitation
for delinquent males if they are over ten and delinquent females if they are over twelve. Since this
distinction was deleted from § 2151.52(B), one must assume it was left here by error.
66. H.B. 460,supra note 36, § 2151.49: "Thejurisdiction ofthejuvenile court over an adjudicated
unruly child shall terminate one year from the date of adjudication." LEAA Standards,supranote34,
STANDARD 14.14 limits the jurisdiction ofthe court to 12 months fora class I delinquent act; 30 months
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House Bill 460 contains no such provision; there is nothing to prevent cases
such as the one described wherein a complaint is dismissed, but the child is
nevertheless committed.
3. No Jailing of Juveniles
House Bill 460 directly prohibited detention in jails67 for juveniles
before or after adjudication. In addition, jail officials who suspected an
inmate to be under eighteen were required to immediately inform the
court.6 S  The original bill also provided first-degree misdemeanor
penalties69 for any person who detained a child in a building in which
adults charged with a criminal offense were held. 0  Substitute House Bill
for a class 2 delinquent act; 48 months or to age 21 whichever occurs first for a class 3 delinquent act; or
until age 21 for a class 4 delinquent act. OJJAC STANDARD, INFORMAL INTERVENTION, supra note 33,
STANDARD 4.5 provides: "The jurisdiction of the receiving agency is to be terminated at the time of the
youth's disengagement from the program." One assumes the "least restrictive alternative" also limits
the time span ofjuvenile court jurisdiction over the less serious cases.
67. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.20(C): "No child shall be placed in or committed to any
prison, jail, or lockup. No child shall be brought into any police station, vehicle, or place where such
child can come in contact or communicate with any adult convicted of crime or under arrest and
charged with crime." This language is almost identical to the language contained in the present Ohio
Juvenile Code, which has been ignored. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.34 (Page 1976). See Oio
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.312(A)(4) (Page 1976): "A child may be detained in jail or other facility for
detention of adults only if the facility in division (A)(3) of this section is not available and the detention
is in a room separate and removed from those for adults." Section 2151.312(A)(3) describes ajuvenile
detention center. OJAAC STANDARD, FORMAL INTERVENTION, supra note 33, STANDARD 4.3 provides:
"Juveniles placed in secure detention facilities should be separated from adult offenders at all times,
subject to regulation of the Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1974 and the Ohio Revised Code," LEAA
STANDARD, supra note 34, STANDARD 5.9 provides: "Under no circumstinces should thesejuveniles be
held in the same detention facilities with adults." IJA-ABA STANDARD, INTERIM STArUs, supra note
35, STANDARD 10.2: "The interim detention of accused juveniles in any facility or part thereof also used
to detain adults is prohibited." See also IJA-ABA STANDARDS, POLICE HANDLING OF JUVENILE
PROaLEMS, supra note 35, STANDARD 2.5(B).
68. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.20(D): "The official in charge of a jail . . . shall inform the
court immediately when a child, who is or appears to be under the age cf eighteen years, is received at
the facility, and shall deliver him . . ." IJA-ABA STANDARD, INTI!RlM STATUs, supra note 35,
STANDARD 5.4 provides: "The holding of an arrested juvenile in any police detention facility prior to
release or transportation to a juvenile facility should be prohibited." The history involved in attempts
to keep juveniles out of adult jails is interesting and informative. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.311
(Page 1976), as enacted in 1969 provided: "(A) A person taking a child into custody shall, with all
reasonable speed and without taking the child elsewhere, either: (1) rel'rase . . . or (2) ... deliver
him to a place of detention." The words "and without taking the child elsewhere," were deleted by
amendment in 1972. Juvenile Rule 7 is consistent with the 1972 enactment. This was done because
police demand that they be authorized to arrest, book, and process juveniles in the same manner and
place as adults.
69. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.21 (Page 1975):
(A) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to a misdemeanor other than a minor
misdempeanor shall be imprisoned for a definite term or fined, or both, which term
of imprisonment and fine shall be fixed by the court as provided in this section,
(B) Terms of imprisonment for misdemeanor shall be imposed as follows:
(I) For a misdemeanor of the first degree, not more than six months.
(C) Fines for misdemeanors shall be imposed as follows:
(1) For a misdemeanor of the first degree, not more than one thousand dollars,....
70. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.99(B): "Whoever violates civision (0) or (H) of section
2151.20 or section 2151.34 of the Revised Code is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree.
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460 continues to allow detention in jails,7' but provides that after January
1, 1981, a county without acceptable detention facilities shall receive no
money from the Ohio Youth Commission. The importance of thig
prohibition should not be overlooked. A survey of juvenile detention
facilities, the Grandfield study,73 reported fifty-six of the eighty-eight Ohio
counties used areas within the county jail for detaining children charged
merely with unruliness or delinquency. The study revealed most
counties did not obey the current Juvenile Code that requires separation of
adults and children.75 Continued use of jails is bad not only for the young
people who are detained in them, but also obviates the need for local or
regional detention and treatment facilities. In effect, the use of jails
guarantees continued reliance on commitment to state institutions7 for
young people who would not be committed to them if these youngsters
71. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.15(C):
No child who is under the age of eighteen shall be placed in or committed to any adult prison,
jail, or lockup, brought into any police station or other place in which he can come into
contact with or communicate with any adult who has been convicted of or is underarrest for
and charged with the commission of an offense, or detained in any jail or building in which
adults charged with or convicted of an offense are kept, except as provided in this section.
A child may be detained in a hospital or similar institution in which adults convicted of
or arrested for the commission of an offense are incidentally kept, if al reasonable efforts are
made to ensure that no child has any contact with any adult who has been convicted or
arrested for an offense and who is being detained in the institution. A child maybe detained
in a building in which adults are detained, if the child is kept on a separate floor or in a
separate living unit that is within the exclusive control ofthejuvenile court and in which only
children are kept, it is impossible for the child to come into contact or converse with adults
being detained in the building, and the children who are detained in the building do not use
hallways, sanitary, eating, or recreational facilities, or any other auxiliary facilities at the
same time they are being used by the adults who are detained in the building.
72. Sub H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 3:
After January 1, 1981, a county that has not established a county detention hone or that
does not belong to a detention home district organized pursuant to section 2151.49 of the
Revised Code shall not receive any money from the Youth Commission pursuant to section
5139.27, 5139.271, 5139.28, or 5139.281 of the Revised Code, any Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration money from the Department of Economic and Community
Development, or any money from the Department of PublicWelfare pursuant toTitleXX of
the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 301, as amended, unless the money
will be used to construct a county or district detention home.
73. GRANDFIELD, COOPER, MILLIGAN, & PETREE, OHIOJuvENLE DEM ioN SuRiyTHE Otio
STATE UNivERsny (1975) [hereinafter cited as GRANDFIELD]. At page 42 of the Grandfield study it is
estimated that only forty counties will still be usingjails as of the end of 1976.
74. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 50: "Clearly, status offenders, such as school
truants or children running from conflicts within their homes, can now be locked in Ohio's county
jails-in the majority of our counties."
75. OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. § 2151.312(A) (Page 1976): "A child alleged to bedelinquent, unruly,
or a juvenile traffc offender may be detained only in the following places. (4) any suitable place
designated by the court." The GRAmNFIELD study, supra note 73, at 13 reported: "tJpon visual
inspection, project staff found that most did not meet the 'separate and removed' requirements. While
visual contact between adults and juveniles was not possible in most ofjadls, verbal communication
was."
76. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 59. Batchelder, in a concurring report asked:
"How soon would monies be available to assist rural counties in developing more alternatives to county
jails and state institutions?" SeeR. SARRI, UNDER LOcK AND Kay: JuvENILEs IN JAILS AND DEwmoN
at 5,13(1974). Ms. Sarri estimates that as many as 500,000 juveniles are processed through localjails
each year. She quotes Judge Young from Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93,99 (N.D. Ohio 1971):
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 39:273
lived in a county with detention and treatment facilities or in one that had
joined a facilities district.77  As many as forty-six Ohio counties have
access to detention and treatment facilities,78 but it is essential that every
county have such access in order to provide adequate services to children
and to eliminate unnecessary juvenile incarceration. 79  In addition, it is
essential that this legislation contain explicit provisions authorizing the
Youth Commission to refuse commitments and to allocate openings
among the respective counties.80 The provisions that could have achieved
this result were deleted from Substitute House Bill 460.
Regional or community detention and treatment facilities located to
serve rural counties could offer many advantages to the child, the juvenile
court system, and society. The staff of these facilities could exercise both
an intake and a diversion function. Where coramunity services are
available, the staff could direct the child to them. Thus, contact with the
formal juvenile justice system would be minimized. If services or
programs were not available, the facility staff would represent a group
interested in program creation and use. Because community programs
generally cost less than institutionalization,1 the taxpayer would benefit
[When the total picture ofconfinement in the Lucas CountyJail is examined, what appears is
confinement in cramped and overcrowded quarters, lightless, airless, damp, liltliy with leaking
water and human waste, slow starvation, deprivation of most human contacts, except with
others in the same subhuman state, no exercise or recreation, little if any medical attention,
no attempt at rehabilitation, and for those who in depair or frustration lash out at their
surrounding, confinement, stripped of clothing and every last vestige of humanity, in a sort of
oubliette.
The GRANDFIELD study, supra note 73, at 14 reports conditions forjuveniles in somejails were no better
than those described by Judge Young in Wittenberg.
77. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.34 (Page 1976) quthorizes each county to provide a detention
home, or join in the formation of a multi-county district to establish a detention facility. H.B. 460,
supra note 36, § 2152.01(C) continues this authorization and makes explicit the right of the facility to
conduct care and treatment programs for adjudicated children. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, §§
2151.49-.50 continue these authorizations. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 5139.27 authorizes the Youth
Commission: (A) to promulgate regulations for the construction of such facilities; and (B) to establish
minimum standards for operation, programs of education, training and rehabilitation, and qualifica-
tions of personnel employed by these facilities.
78. Allen, Ashland, Ashtabula, Butler, Clark, Cuyahoga, Erie, Franklin, Hamilton, Lake,
Lorain, Lucas, Mahoning, Montgomery, Muskingum, Richland, Sandusky, Seneca, Summit, Trum-
bull, Warren and Wood Counties have independent county detention facilities. Morgan County
contracts with Muskingum County for services. Portage, Geauga, Belmont, Harrison, Delaware,
Union, Madison, Champaign, Logan, Fayette, Pickaway, Ross, Pike, Vinton, Jackson, Columblana,
Holmes, Stark, Tuscarawas, and Wayne have their own regional detention facilities. Carroll, Licking,
and Guernsey contract for services from regional facilities.
79. Most Task Force members agreed that Ohio Youth Commission institutions should be
reserved for the 414 children who are presently being confined for comm tting violent crimes, Youth
Commission officials agreed that many children committed to institutions could be more appropriately
treated in community treatment programs. Evidence for all this is the drastic reduction in Fairfield
population from 1100 to under 500 because of the threat of a right to treatment suit.
80. The Task Force recommended the Youth Commission be given power to limit its population
and to refuse commitments. See H.B. 460,supra note 36, § 5139.03(B), (C); the authoroy'ofthe Youth
Commission to refuse to allocate commitments is not found in Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42.
81. Lemert, Instead of Court, Diversion in Juvenile Justice, PunLic HEALTht SERv. Ptiu. No,
2127 (1971); Smith, A Quiet Revolution, Probation Subsidy, HEW No. (SRS) 72-26011. Between
1966 and 1972, Smith concluded California had saved over 126 million dollars, and the saving was
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greatly. In addition to intake and diversion, the regional facility could
coordinate local probation services and treatmentprograms. This would
minimize the need for state institutionalization.8 Under the proposed
Code, the Ohio Youth Commission is empowered to promulgate
regulations for the construction of these facilities and to establish
minimum standards for operation, educational programs, training and
rehabilitation, and personnel qualifications.83
Summarizing the immediate goals of the Task Force, one finds: (1)
closing of Fairfield; (2) prohibiting Youth Commission commitment of
status offenders; (3) establishing minimum ages for commitment of
delinquents; and (4) prohibiting uses ofjails forjuveniles. In addition, the
Task Force recommended legislation that would: (5) restrictjuvenile court
jurisdiction over unruly children; (6) extend juvenile court jurisdiction
over "Parents Subject to Compulsory Child Rearing Assistance"; (7)
extend the court's power to decree emancipation; and (8) establish a
growing each year. Probation subsidy programs have reduced commitments each year in California
as follows:
1966-67 1398
1967-68 2416
1968-69 3319
1969-70 3557
1970-71 4495
1971-72 5266
1972-73 5449
1973-74 5027
Both adult and juvenile offenders were participants. See also Onio TASK FORCE REPOrT, Spra note
24, at 18.
82. See OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 88-96.
More thanlocalprograms or facilities are needed to curbjuvenile commitments to the Ohio Youth
Commission. Cuyahoga County has long committed, based on population, three times as many
juveniles to the Ohio Youth Commission as Summit County. Cuyahoga County will continue to
overcommit to state institutions until it becomes less costly for the Cuyahoga County treasury to place
these juveniles in community programs. This seems directly contrary to the needs ofthejuvenile; and
it is directly contrary to the best interests of the Ohio taxpayer when ajuvenile is placed in a very costly
state program that does not do as much for him as a much less costly local program. Forstatistics on
annual permanent commitment to the Ohio Youth Commission from each county, see the Annual
Report of the Ohio Youth Commission.
83. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 5139.27; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5139.27, 5139.271, 5138.28,
5139.281 (Supp. 1977); IA-ABA STANDARDS, CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 35,
STANDARD § 2.1; IJA:ABA STANDARDS, ARCHrrEcruREoFFACILITIES,SUpranote35,STANDARD 1.14.
The IJA-ABA STANDARDS recommend that corrections be placed under a single state agency rather
than "a proliferation of agencies at both the state and local level" IJA-ABA STANDARDS, CoRRECTION
ADmINISTRATION, supra note 35, STANDARD 2.1. The authority given to the Youth Commission,
however, seems to satisfy recommendations on quality control of facilities and programs. It is possible
the proposed Juvenile Code may have incorporated the best state agency standards with the best
community control and leadership. OJJAC Standards, supra note 33, at §§ 11.1, 11.2, 11.3
recommend alternatives to state institutionalization, the licensing and regulation of residential
alternatives, and the establishment of minimum standards for these programs. LEAA STANDARDS,
supra note 34, at ch. 22, recommends a single state agency, but admits centralization will not cure
existing problems. It prohibits use ofjails, but gives the centralized state agency no more power than
the proposed Code awards to the Youth Commission for setting standards for facilities, programs,
training and staff. In LEAA STANDARD, supra note 34, STANDARD 2.1, it is said:"Localities should be
responsible for the operation of direct service programs for delinquency prevention. This responsibili-
ty should include identifying local needs and resources, developing programs to resolve the needs and
delivering the services needed."
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maximum ceiling time length for juvenile commitment at a state
institution.
84
4. Jurisdiction Over Unruly Children
The Task Force unanimously concluded that the vague language
defining the unruly child was intolerable and contributed to the
arbitrariness of the system.85 Some of the Task Force members argued
that court jurisdiction over juvenile noncriminal behavior should be
terminated.86  These members also felt that ifjuvenile courts did not waste
so much time and resources on less significant misbehavior patterns, the
courts would have adequate time and resources to achieve better results
with delinquents. The Task Force finally decided to eliminate only the
more arbitrary provisions of the existing Code.87  The House Judiciary
84. . OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 4-5.
85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Page 1976):
As used in sections 2151.01 to 2151.54, inclusive, of the Revised Code, "Unruly child"
includes any child:
(A) Who does not subject himself to the reasonable control of his parents, teachers,
guardian, or custodian, by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient;
(B) Who is an habitual truant from home or school;
(C) Who so deports himself as to injure or endanger the health or morals ofhimself or
others;
(D) Who attempts to enter the marriage relation in any state without the consent of his
parents, custodian, legal guardian, or other legal authority;
(E) Who is found in a disreputable place, visits, or patronizes,- place prohibited by law,
or associates with vagrant, vicious, criminal, notorious, or immoral persons;
(F) Who engages in an occupation prohibited by law, or is in a situation dangerous to
life or limb or injurious to the health or morals of himself or others;
(G) Who has violated a law applicable only to a child.
OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 37. See also Willey, supra note 17, at 159-62 (1970).
86. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 35, at 2:
These standards take the position that the present jurisdiction of the juvenile court over
noncriminal misbehavior-the status offense jurisdiction-should be cut short and a system
of voluntary referral to services provided outside the juvenile justice system adopted in its
stead. . . . However, because of . . . youth who run away, who are in circumstance of
immediate jeopardy, who are in need of alternative living arrangem.-nts when they and their
parents cannot agree, and who evidence a need for emergency medical services-some
carefully limited official intervention is preserved. .. "
The LEAA Standards eliminated the traditional status offense, but gave the court jurisdiction over the
"family with service needs" in cases involving: (1) school truancy; (2) repeated disregard for or misuse
of lawful parental authority; (3) repeated running away from home; (4) repeated use of intoxicating
beverages; and (5) delinquent acts committed by a juvenile younger than ten years of age. LEAA
STANDARDS, supra note 34, at 312. It is contemplated that the court will have power to order parents,
as well as agencies, to modify their behavior in these cases. The OJJAC STANDARDS, supra note 35,
STANDARDS 13.1-13.5 recommend the deinstitutionalization of status olfenders, but continues court
jurisdiction over them with emphasis on voluntary programs. Within the limits of least restrictive
alternative, coercive court action is contemplated.
87. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 37. Sub H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.13'
[As used in Chapter 2151 of the Revised Code] "unruly child" includes any child: (A)
Who does not subject himself to a reasonable control of his parents, teachers, guardian, or
custodian, by reason of being habitually disobedient; (B) Who is an habitual truant from
home or school; (C) Who engages in sexual conduct, as defined ir section 2907.01 of the
Revised Code, with another child; (D) Who attempts to enter the marriage relation in any
state without the consent of his parents, custodian, legal guardian, or other legal authority;
(E) Who is found in or patronizes a place prohibited by law: (F) Who engages in an
occupation prohibited by law; (G) Who has violated a law applicable only to a child.
The original H.B. 460 did not include (A) or (C).
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Committee, however, added a provision on disobedience that seems to
reopen the juvenile system to the charge of arbitrariness. This author
hopes for the elimination of this provision prior to the final passage of the
bill.
88
The Task Force recommended the elimination of sections allowing
institutionalization of status offenders.8 9 The Task Force also understood
some juvenile court intervention and use of "leverage" might be essential
with a youth or family member who refuses to participate in community
treatment programs.90
5. Parents Subject to Compulsory Child Rearing Assistance
The Task Force heard considerable testimony that family failure is a
very important contributor to juvenile misbehavior and that juvenile
courts fail or lack power to order appropriate family participation in
treatment programs. 9' Consequently, the Task Force recommended an
addition to the jurisdiction of thejuvenile court: jurisdiction over"Parents
Subject to Compulsory Child Rearing Assistance."92 The Ohio Juvenile
Court Judges Association asserted these sections were patently unconsti-
tutional93 and unnecessary since the court presently has jurisdiction over
88. See Willey, supra note 17, at 159-162 (1970).
89. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 46.
90. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6-64. Two members of the Cleveland Heights-
University Heights Youth Service Bureau argued that ultimate court intervention %as essential in
some habitual misbehavior cases, and that a street-wise youth might play the counseling game to the
hilt. They argued the possibility and threat of early court intervention is essential to the counseling
process with this type of youth, and also, with any recalcitrant family member.
91. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 38; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.359 (Page
1976): "[Tlhe court shall have power to:] make an order restraining or otherwise controlling thcconduct
of any parent . . ." if such an order is necessary to"(A) Control any conduct or relationship that will
be detrimental or harmful to the child; (B) Where such conduct or relationship will tend to defeat the
execution of the order of disposition made or to be made." It is generally agreed that a court can enjoin
a parent's harmful act and has contempt powers that might apply to parents, but it was also agreed the
current practice is to order the parents into counseling and then coercing the parent by threatening to
commit his child if the parent does not cooperate. Since many cases are initiated by the parent against
the child, many parents refuse to obey the court in order to further punish the child. The purpose of
these sections is to give the court powerto coerce the parent bysome other method than commitment or
punishment of the child. Somejuvende court judges cited this section as evidence that they already had
the power, others argued the proposed sections would be an unconstitutional extension ofcourt power
into family matters.
92. All references to parents subject to compulsory child rearing assistance were deleted from
Sub. H.B. 460. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.35(B) does not extend the court'sjurisdiction as
did H.B, 460, supra note 36, § 2151.60(A) which provides: "[such a 'Parent' is one] who does not
provide proper parental care, as defined in section 2151.61 of the Revised Code, by the reason of the
harmful behavior of the parent . . ." "Harmful behavior means an act or failure (1) Within the
discretion of a parent . . .(2) has directly contributed to the delinquency unruliness, or dependency
of the child" LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 86, OJJAC STANDARDS, supra note 33, recommended
the strengthening of community facilities and services to make available the basic needs of the familr
counseling, employment, food and health care, housing, day care and education. UA-ABA
STANDARDS. Noncriminal Misbehavior, supra note 35, STANDARD 4.2 rests on the premise that
"services should be offered on a voluntary basis, and thejuvenile and the family should not be required
to receive such services in cases involving thejuvenile's unruly behavior which does not contravene the
criminal law."
93. OHIO JUVENILE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, THE ANALYSIS, JtVENILE JuSTc E REFOft B ILL 5 (1977)
notes:.
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parents under Juvenile Rule 34(D).94 Juvenile Rule 34 (D), however,
only authorizes the court to restrain those who interfere with dispositional
orders; the Rule has never been interpreted to empower the court to order
parents into counseling.
The court's current practice is to assume jurisdiction over a child
because of the child's repeated disregard for parental authority, even
though the child's refusal to obey may arise f'om the parent's conduct.
The juvenile court then threatens parents with the child's commitment if
the parents do not change their unreasonable ways or seek counseling.
This seems more than a bit unjust as far as the child is concerned. Insofar
as the parents often have filed the complaint, commitment of the child is
exactly what the parents are seeking. The proposed sections give the court
jurisdiction over a parent who does not provide a child with proper
parental care because of the parents' harmful behavior.95 The court will
also have the power to punish parental failure with contempt.9 6 Addition-
ally, the key phrases "proper parental care"97 and "harmful behavior" are
defined.98
The bill attempts to establish jurisdiction in personam over parents by a new classifica-
tion "Parents Subject to Compulsory Child Rearing Assistance." A careful study of H.B
section 2151.60 indicates this provision is patently unconstitutwonal, being vague and
indefinite, and furthermore it is unnecessary as the court has authority over conduct of
parents pursuant to Juv. R. 34(D). Proposed Section 2151.60 has clear definitional
limits; while Juv R. 34(D) and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.359 (Page 1976) have no statutory
limits at all. If thejuvenile rule is constitutional, the proposed section is also.
94. Juv. R. 34(D): "In any proceeding where a child is made a ward of the court, the court may
grant a restraining order controlling the conduct of any party if the court finds that such order is
necessary to control any conduct or relationship which may be detrimental or harmful to the child and
tend to defeat the execution of a dispositional order."
95. H.B. 460, supra note 92, § 2151.60(A).
96. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.67 allowed the court to:
(A) Enjoin the person from continuing to do any act upon which the adjudication was
based. [This gives the court approximately the same powers asJuv. R. (D), but the following
section seems to extend it.]
(B) Require the person to obtain counseling or treatment, provided by the court or any
public or private agency provided such counseling or treatment doe.b not conflict in time with
the person's employment, and providing such counseling or treatment is rationally related to
the act upon which the adjudication is based or to the causes of that act.
(C) Failure to comply with an order entered pursuant to this section may be
adjudged contempt of court and punished accordingly.
97. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.61 defines proper parental care:
A child whose home is filthy and unsanitary; whose parents, stepparents, guardian, or
custodian permit him to become dependent, unruly, or delinquent, whose parents, steppar-
ents, guardian, or custodian refuse or neglect to provide him with necessary care, support,
medical attention, and educational facilities; or whose parents, stepparents, guardian or
custodian fail to subject such child to necessary discipline is without proper parental care or
guardianship.
This author would like to see the elimination of words "whose home is filthy and unsanitary; whose
parents, stepparents, guardian, or custodian permit him to become dependent, unruly or delinquent,"
but realizes that they are limited by H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.60(B) to specific: (1) "acts or
failures." (2) within the discretion of the parent, and (3) which has directly contributed to the
delinquency, unruliness or dependency ofthe child. Given these specific and detailed limitations, these
words are less vague than the present statute. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN § 2151.05 (Page 1976).
98. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.60(B): "[A]s used in this section,'harmful behavior' means an
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That parents are subject to compulsory child rearing assistance is not
a new idea. Ohio has a similar concept incorporated in the present Code?9
and Rules.'0° The concept has been adequately studied and presented in
the Standards.'0 ' Furthermore, it is recognized in many cases that the
problem lies with a parent or other family member rather than with the
child; the juvenile court has no power to compel a parent to seek treatment
or counseling, and it is unfair to stigmatize the child with an unruliness
adjudication when his parents are at fault. The proposed sections allow
the court to direct appropriate orders to the offending parents. The court
would not be required to hold the child hostage as an adjudicated offender
and commit him if his parents did not correct their behavior.102 This
additional juvenile court jurisdiction over offending family members may
have been the most important reform in the proposed legislation. It could
have contributed to strengthening the family and ultimately reducing
delinquency. The House Judiciary Committee, however, eliminated these
sections from Substitute House Bill 460. Since these proposed sections
represent less of an intrusion into family matters than Ohio's present
sections that define neglect 03 and contributing, °0 this author hopes they
will be replaced before final passage of the Bill.
6. Emancipation
Despite juvenile justice reform, cases will remain in which the parent-
child conflict cannot be resolved; the individuals are good citizens and
obey the law, but the child justifiably wants to control his life. The
existing emancipation doctrine appears to be based on parental consent;
however, in a nonuniform way, it has been extended to rest on child
behavior. Consequently, one author concludes it is impossible to predict
what will happen in the future by studying existing cases.' 05 Yet many
act or failure to actwhich is (1) within the discretion of a parent, stepparent, guardian, orcustodian ofa
child; (2) has directly contributed to the delinquency, unruliness, or dependency of the child."
99. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.05 (Page 1976).
100. Juv. R. 34(D).
101. LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, at 311-32, & Appendix4, at 796. See also PREsDENT 's
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
YOUTH CRIME (1967).
102. See UIA-ABA STANDARDS, ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 35, STANDARD 2.1 for a clear
articulation of the hostage principle: "Courts should be authorized to assumejurisdiction in order to
condition continued parental custody upon the parents' accepting supervision . ." It is difficult to
argue this jurisdiction is in the best interest of the child or consistent with the least restrictive
alternative.
103. OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 3113.01-.99 (Page 1972).
104 OHIo R v. CODE ANN. § 2151.41 (Page 1976). See Commint, Cvnirlbbtingto Delinquen-
cy: An Exercise in Judicial Speculatiov, 9 ARcioN L. REv. 566 (1976).
105. C. MEIER, OHIO FAMILY LAw 267 (1963). See also id. § 32.12, at 275:
"Emancipation" means the freeing of a minor child from parental control . . . may be
implied as well as express, and may takea variety of forms orbe inferred under any diversity
of circumstances which recognize the child as person suijuris. Thus sending him forth to shift
for himself, or compelling him to support himself shows emancipation.
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cases have protected the minor's interest while maintaining parental
obligations. Areas in which these cases have arisen include: (1) right-to-
wage cases; (2) intra-family tort cases; and (3) diversity jurisdiction
cases.10 6 The common law has allowed emancipation in cases concerning:
(1) marriage of the child, (2) induction into the armed services; (3)
establishment of a domicile different from that of the parents; and (4)
establishment of economic independence.'0 7 In addition, many states
presently have emancipation statutes.
The proposed sections attempt to bring order to this very confusing
area of the law. They are based on a concept fully articulated in the
Standards.' 8 The two major studies, IJA-ABA and LEAA, differ only on
whether the courts should be able to enter a decree of emancipation.
109
Despite the divergence on this point, these studies agree on the proof that
should be required before a court can enter a finding of emancipation.
Under the sections on emancipation, the child has the burden of establish-
ing the facts necessary to support the petition." 0 The sections are
106. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, RIGHTS OF MINORS, supra note 35, STANDARD 2.1: "Anew approach
to emancipation":
A. The legal issues traditionally resolved by reference to the emancipation doctrine
should be resolved legislatively as aspects of the substantive doctrines which govern legal
relationships between child and parent, between parent and parent, between child and
nonmembers of the family, and between parents and nonmembers of the family.
B. Legislatively created, narrowly drawn doctrines which obviate the need for relying
upon the vague criteria of the traditional emancipation doctrine should include the following
principles:
1. a parent should not be permitted to recover from the child's employer wages
due or paid by the employer to the child;
2. a child should be permitted to sue his or her parent and the parent should be
permitted to sue the child for damages arising from intentional or negligent tortious
behavior so long as the behavior is not related to the exercise (if family functions ...
107. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, RIGHTS OF MINORS, supra note 35, at 21-30.
108. LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, at STANDARD 14.24:
The Family court should have the power to enter an order of responsible self-sufficiency in
favor of any juvenile. Before making such an order, the court must determine: (1) That the
juvenile wishes to be free from parental control; (2) That he or she understands the
consequences of being free from parental control; and (3) That he or she has an acceptable
plan for independent living and self-support and the apparent ability and maturity to
implement such a plan. The legal effect of an order of responsible self-sufficiency is the
complete emancipation of the minor child."
109. Compare IJA-ABA STANDARDS, RIGHTS OF MINORS, supra note 35, STANDARD 2.1 with
LEAA STANDARD, supra note.34, STANDARD 14.24:
(C) Because legal disputes concerning the activities and needs of children will
inevitably arise between the child and parent, between parent and parent, between child and
nonmembers of the family, and between parents and nonmembers of the family and the
disputes will arise in contexts and present legal issues which cannot be forecast legislatively,
the legislature should also enact an emancipation doctrine of general applicability.
I. The doctrine should not permit emancipation by judicial decree.
2. The doctrine should be explicitly limited to issues not addressed by other standards
of this volume and should authorize a finding of emancipatibn when a child, prior to
the age of majority, has established a residence separate from that of his or her
family, whether or not with parental consent or consent ofa person responsible for
his or her care, and is managing his or her own financial affairs,"
110. H.B. 460, supra note 36, §§ 2151.70-.74. The child must be over 16; his petition must show
the cessation of mutual duties between parent and child will be in the best interests of the child and that
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designed to protect the mature and responsible juvenile who is in serious
conflict with his parents. Thus, the sections apply only to juveniles over
sixteen who have plans for their physical needs, education, and support.
The proposed legislation makes the child responsible for his actions as if
he were eighteen, however, the court retains jurisdiction to modify the
emancipation order.
During the House Judiciary Committee's final review, the emancipa-
tion sections were eliminated. This writer feels the proposed sections
would be a positive improvement over the presently confused state of the
law. The sections are consistent with the substantive recommendations of
the two most recent studies of juvenile law.' In short, these sections
would provide mature and responsible juveniles a badly needed remedy
and this author hopes they will be reinserted before the Bill's final adop-
tion.
7. Time Limit on Institutional Commitments
The final priority item listed by the Task Force was the establishment
of a maximum time length for institutional juvenile commitment.112 The
Task Force decided to limit commitments to insure no child would be
institutionalized longer than the maximum adult prison term for the same
act. In comparison to the recommendation of the Standards, this is an
exceedingly harsh position; however, it is no worse than the present
Juvenile Code. 13 Nevertheless, the House Judiciary Committee amended
he has plans for his physical needs, further education and financial well-being. A full hearing, after
service on all necessary people is mandated, and the court can impose limitations and conditions in the
decree.
11. The two major studies are cited in,notes 108 & 109 supra. The STANDARDS require the
child to have an acceptable plan for independent living and self-support. The child must also be
managing his or her own affairs. The LEAA STANDARDS recommend ajudicial decree to establish this;
while the HA-ABA STANDARDS are to the contrary. But the HA-ABA provision requires a finding as
to the critical facts. There is no way to arrive at "findings" without a judicial hearing with
accompanying decree. Hence, both studies require judicial intervention and a judicial decree of
emancipation. See also JA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 35, STANDARD
5.1. This Standard provides, relative to the noncriminal child, that the juvenile court can decree an
alternative residential placement over the objection of the parent.
112. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.59(C): "No order of commitment shall continue for a period
longer than the maximum term for which an adult convicted of the same act as the child could be
imprisoned." IJA-ABA STANDARDS, JUVENILE DELiNQUENcY AND SANCTIoNs, supra note 35,
STANDARD 5.2 classifies all criminal acts within five classes ofjuvenile offenses. Juvenile offense Class
1 includes crimes that carry a sentence of death or life imprisonment; Class 2 includes crimes that carry
sentences between 5 and 20 years; Class 3 includes crimes that carry sentences between I and 5 years;
Class 4 includes crimes that carry sentences between 6 months and I year;, and Class 5 includes crimes
that carry sentences of less than 6 months. STANDARD 6.2 provides the length of thejuvenile sanction,
which in all cases is a lesser time than the minimum adult sentence;, whether the confinement should be
in a secure facility, or whether the penalty should be a conditional freedom (probation). LEAA
STANDARDS, supra note 34, STANDARDS 14.13, 14.14 present a similar scheme, though potential
confinement for the juvenile is longer than provided by the UA-ABA STANDARDS. OJJAC STAND-
ARD, supra note 33, STANDARD 7.4 provides for the least restrictive alternative.
113. Omo TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5,25; OHIO REy. CODE § 2151.23 (Page 1976).
The jurisdiction of the court attaches in accordance with this section and continues until thejuvenile
reaches age 21. See Slawskiv. Slawski, 49 Ohio App. 100,195 N.E. 258 (Ct. App. Lucas County 1934);
In re Davis, 22 Ohio Op. 108, 179 N.E.2d 198 (Juv. Ct Marion County 1971).
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the section to allow harsher treatment for juveniles than adults who
commit the same misdemeanor. With respect to felonies, however, the
House Judiciary Committee restricted maximum commitment ofjuveniles
to the minimum adult term.t114 Because institutionalization has so many
adverse effects on the juvenile, it is wrong to allow a child to be committed
for a longer term than an adult even for misdemeanors."1 5 The proposed
legislation, however, does include time limits for the commitment of
delinquent and unruly children.
116
B. Additional Juvenile Code Reform Sections
The legislative changes discussed up to this point have related to
specific goals or priorities designated by the Task Force in its report.
Many other changes were considered, recommended, and incorporated
in House Bill 460. In one form or another, some of these changes are
incorporated in Substitute House Bill 460.
1. Intake
One of the most important changes recommended by the Task Force
was the addition of a single paragraph to the purpose section of the existing
Juvenile Code.' 17 The section provides a legislative basis for court intake
powers and indicates a preference for noninvolvement by the court.,
18
114. Sub H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.30(B):
No order of commitment for a delinquent child shall continue for a period of time that is
longer than: (1) one hundred twenty days, if the act for which the child was adjudicated
delinquent would be a misdemeanor of the second, third, or fourth degree if committed by an
adult; (2) the maximum term for which an adult convicted of the same act could be sentenced,
if the act for which the child was adjudicated delinquent would be a misdemeanor of the first
degree if committed by an adult; (3) the longest minimum term for which an adult convicted
of the same act could be sentenced under section 2929.11 of the Revised Code, if the act for
which the child was adjudicated delinquent would be a felony if committed by an adult.
115. See IJA-ABA STANDARD, DISPOSITIONS, supra note 35, STA14DARD 3.3(B). This Standard
suggests a presumption against coercively removing a juvenile from his or her home.
116. H.B. 460, supra note 35, § 2151.47:
(C) Place the child in a nonsecure treatment program . . . for a period not to exceed
ninety days; and
(E) ...may commit the child to a secure treatment facility . . . for not more than
thirty days . .. If a disposition pursuant to this division has previously been ordered in a
case, no further disposition pursuant to this division shall be ordered."
Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.27(E)(3) extends disposition of unrnlies in nonsecure programs to
one year. It allows use of secure programs for up to thirty days for unrulics who violate probation or
who refuse to remain in nonsecure programs. This conflicts with curient provisions of the Federal
Act, supra note 27.
117. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.01(E): "To achieve the forgoing purposes in
appropriate cases without official court action."
118. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS, supra note 35, STANDARD
1.3 provides for discretionary dismissal in appropriate cases. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRINIINAL
MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 35, STANDARD 1.1 provides that a juv.-nile's acts of misbehavior,
ungovernability, or unruliness should not constitute a ground forjuven He courtjurisdiction. LEAA
STANDARD, supra note 34, STANDARD 14.16 requires (1) an adjudication of delinquency and (2) a
finding that the juvenile is in need of supervision, care or treatment; otherwise, STANDARD 14.4 requires
the least restrictive alternative. OJJAC STANDARDS, supra note 33, at 29 emphasize prevention
measures even before informal intervention and services to preclude tle least restrictive alternative.
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The 1969 Ohio Juvenile Code does not contain provisions for intake,11 9
although the 1972 Juvenile Rules provide that court action should be
avoided. 120  The Rules also allow informal screening by the court before
the filing of a complaint.12' The Rules, however, cannot override specific
language of the Juvenile Code that allows any person to file a complaint) 22
Some police departments believed courts could not refuse to accept or act
upon police complaints. 2 3  The additional purpose clause is reinforced by
a proposed section that empowers the court to establish an intake
department. 24  In addition, the court is specifically authorized to make
informal adjustments without a hearing. 25
119. See Willey, supra note 17, at 170-71: "The Ohio act does not provide for intake screening,
and the sections listing the contents of the complaint do not require an allegation that the child is 'in
need of treatment and rehabilitation.' ...Such a requirement would support the fundamental
concept of juvenile justice, and should surely be included as a legislative standard." (footnotes
omitted).
120. Juv. R. 9:
(A) Court action to be avoided. In all appropriate cases formal action should be
avoided and other community resources utilized to ameliorate situations brought
to the attention of the court.
121. Id.:
(B) Screening, referral. Information that a child is within the courtsjurisdiction may
be informally screened prior to the filing of a complaint to determine whether the
filing of a complaint is in the best interests of the child and the public.
122. Id. OHIO REVISED CODE § 2151.27 (Page 1976): "Any person . . . may, with respect to
such child file a sworn complaint in thejuvenile court . . ." Sub. H.B. 460,supra notc42, § 2151.25 no
longer gives anyone the right to file a complaint. It allows one to file an affidavit alleging certain facts,
which is then screened before a complaint is filed. See Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.21.
123. OHIo CoNsr. art. IV, § 5(b) provides: "The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules governing
practice and procedure in all courts of the State, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right . . ." The rules can never take precedence over statutes which create substantive
rights, and no rule is valid if it would abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive right in question. While
there is no precise definition of "substantive" or "procedural," substantive rules of law create, define,
and regulate rights and obligations while procedural rules pertain to methods of enforcement. The
changes in the proposed Juvenile Code define, extend or limit substantive rights; or to put it another
way, define, extend or limit subject matterjurisdiction. This is a legislative and statutory perogative,
not ajudicial rule making one. Those sections that mandate speedy trial or hearing rights aredesigned
to protect constitutional rights and improvejustice, clearly within the scope oflegislative action. The
legislative reform that requires a verbatim record is designed to improve the monitoring ofjuvenile
courts by the appellate courts in order to protect the child and thejuvenile process. These rightswere
being protected by prior practice or rules. Requiring a written opinion is designed to accomplish a
similar goal increased accountability of juvenile court judges. See J. Patrick Browne's forthcoming
treatise on Ohio Civil Procedure which will be published by West Publishing Co. under the title, Ohio
Methods of Procedure; and an article extracted from it entitled, Civil Rule One and the Principle of
Primacy-A Guide to the Resolution of Conflict Between Statutes and the Civil Rules, which will
appear in 5 OHIO N. L. REv. -(1978).
124. Sub. H.B. 460,supra note 42, § 2151.21(A) gives the court authority. to establish an intake
department; adopt by journal entry uniform standards and procedures recommended by the Juvenile
Judges of the Ohio Judicial Conference; screen all allegations prior to the filing ofa complaint; engage
in diversion; establish rules and procedures therefor, and use alternative community services. Section
2151.21(C) requires prosecutorial comment on the proposed intake rules, but gives the prosecutors no
power to modify the rules. The original H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.29 gave the prosecutor an
important voice in establishing intake standards.
125. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.21(B) gives the court or an official designated by the
court the power to make a preliminary inquiry and such informal adjustment as is practicable before
the complaint is filed. The prosecutor is given no real power relative to the screening process or
procedures. See also OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 135.
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The proposed section of original House Bill 460 concerning intake
provided for involvement of the prosecutor during the organization of the
intake department, the creation of standards for its; governance, and the
decision on informal adjustments.1 6  The Task Force thought this
compromise was better than vesting all intake power in the court or in the
prosecutor.127 Although the Task Force proposals were not new ideas'
28
and were consistent with LEAA and IJA-ABA Standards, 29 Substitute
House Bill 460 allows prosecutorial involvement whenever requested by
the juvenile court, but preserves intake and diversion power to the court.
The possible unconstitutionality of judicial administration of intake
services supports prosecutorial involvement during intake decisions. 130 It
has often been argued the judiciary cannot decide whom to prosecute and
also perform impartial judicial functions during trial. For instance, even
though the court may not actually participate in the decision to prosecute a
juvenile, the court has participated in the intake staff selection and training
and has confidence in its judgment. 3' Furthermore, even if judicial
involvement and control of intake is constitutional, serious doubt remains
regarding its propriety. 3 2  Consequently, the Standards recommend
126. See H.B. 460,supra note 36, § 2151.29(A); OHIoTASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 135-
37. An intake officer or department is essential, but to avoid the abuse; common in"unofftcial" cases,
it is essential that definite intake criteria be established and published. An intake department will reject
some complaints because of insignificance or other reasons and will also be responsible for diversion
programs. Given the coercive potential involved in an offer of diversion, published standards are
essential. Since diversion programs impinge on the freedom of the child, with the advice of counsel he
should be able to refuse unofficial treatment or diversion and demani a full adjudicatory hearing,
127. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION, supra note 35, at 50 advances the position that an
intake officer should make the initial decision on intake. If the intake officer declines to file the
petition, the complainant can seek review by the prosecutor; it is clear the prosecutor has the final
decision. The commentary to § 4.1 at 54 points out the decision to prosecute is discretionary, has been
lodged within the prosecutorial office, and prosecutors enjoy immunity for duties performed within
this role. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, COURT ORGANIZATION AND ADMINI;TRATION, supra note 35, at 14.
STANDARD 1.2 recommends that intake, detention and probation services be removed from the
judicial branch and placed within the executive branch where these services can be independent of the
court and develop the social service expertise not usually found in law trainedjudges, Itisargued that
due process might require juvenile courts to rid themselves of prosecutorial or intake decision making
powers. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, JUVENILE PROBATION FUNCTION, supra note 35, STANDARD 4,1
acknowledges this office is charged with intake, investigative and probationary functions, but that they
are inconsistent. It emphasizes the need to use specialists for each ofthese functions. ThethreelJA-
ABA groups cited above acknowledge that if the services are comb ned within one agency, some
needless duplication of effort can be avoided. LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, STANDARD 21.1
recommend that intake be handled by a state agency to insure unifcrmity throughout the state. It
argues the court should be restricted to ajudicial function. The Standard suggests that an intake agency
screen complaints, satisfy the investigative function relative to dispositions, and act as an intake agency
for state institutions or programs. LEAA STANDARD, supra note 34, STANDARD 15,13 very clearly
gives the prosecutor final decision on whether a complaint should ultimately be filed. OJJAC
STANDARDS, supra note 33, STANDARDS 5.1-5.6 are very brief, recommend intake services, and give the
intake staff authority to dismiss complaints. All the above groups utdize the intake office to achieve
diversion whenever possible.
128. FLA. STAT. § 39.04 (Supp. 1973).
129. See supra note 127.
130. See UA-ABA STANDARDS, JUVENILE PROBATION FUNCTION, supra note 35, at 128 (1977).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 129.
OHIO JUVENILE CODE
executive branch administration of intake services rather than court
administration. 133 This recommendation is well supported by constitu-
tional and common-law concepts of prosecutorial functions.13 4  It has
always been the prosecutor who has decided whether to prosecute. 35 The
judiciary has not had a similar power and it seems inconsistent with our
basic governmental principle to give one branch of government both
decisions.
Despite the preference for vesting intake control with the prosecutor,
control of the intake department will remain in the juvenile court struc-
ture.136  The Task Force recommendations that the prosecutor should
have discretionary power to proceed against charged individuals 37 and to
submit standards for the operation of the intake department also were
eliminated from Substitute House Bill 460. Even though the prosecutor
protects public interest and safety by insuring that all are prosecuted who
should be, a separate intake department within the executive department
would operate more effectively. Given the present low level of public
confidence in criminal and juvenile courts, increased public scrutiny
through control of intake by an executive agency is warranted and may
prove to be beneficial.
2. Least Restrictive Alternative
The proposed addition to the purpose section was followed in original
House Bill 460 by what is usually called the "Children's Bill of Rights."1
38
The history and purpose of this section will not be discussed here, but
three of its provisions relate to the problem of certain youths receiving
overly harsh dispositional treatment. Subsection G required treatment by
the "least restrictive method" for all unruly juveniles or delinquents.
Although the Children's Bill of Rights was eliminated from Substitute
House Bill 460, this particular right was retained. 139 The least restrictive
alternative approach has been used in first amendment cases, 40 civil
commitment cases,' 4 ' and criminal cases alleging excessive punishment. 42
133. Id. at 126.
134. UA-ABA STANDARDS, PROSECUTION, supra note 35, at 55.
135. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 1.1
(Approved Draft 1971).
136. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.21.
137. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.29(A): "If no such informal adjustment is possible, the
prosecuting attorney may file an information . . ."
138. See H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.02.
139. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.02(G): "Treatment by the least restrictive method in cases
in which he is adjudicated delinquent or unruly." Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42. § 2151.27(L).
140. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Note, Less Drastic Afeans and the Firt
Amendment, 78 YALE LJ. 464 (1969).
141. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1966).
142. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649,
519 P.2d 1073 (1974); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921 (1972).
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The most compelling argument for the doctrine is stated in Beyond the
Best Interests of the Child. 43  The Standards recommend the least
restrictive alternative approach be included in the juvenile codes. The
Standards also recommend that judges provide a written opinion that
includes the facts relied upon in support of the given disposition, and the
reason for rejecting less restrictive alternatives.144 Substitute House Bill
460 requires a written opinion 45 and verbatim records of oral proceed-
ings.14
6
3. Sex Discrimination
Subsection H 147 was included in House Bill 460 to eliminate discrimi-
nation that resulted in higher institutional commitment rates for unruly
females. t48  This section also was aimed at reducing the commitment of
unmarried pregnant girls who are too poor to exploit the community
alternatives open to the affluent.1 49 In short, Subsection H was designed
to eliminate commitment discrimination on the basis of sex or wealth.
Unfortunately, this subsection does not appear in Substitute House Bill
460. In addition, neither the original Bill nor the amended version address
crucial problems such as venereal disease, contraception and pregnancy.' 0
Many children are unwilling or unable to acknowledge to their parents
that they are sexually active.'' Consequently, these children are unable
to obtain sex education, counseling or medical treatment because they
cannot secure parental consent152 The Standards address this issue and
143. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTL RESTS OF THE CHILD 53 (1973),
144. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS, DISPOSITIONS, supra note 35, STANDARD 21.1: "The imposition
of a particular disposition should be accompanied by a statement of the facts relied on in support of the
disposition and the reasons for selecting the disposition and rejecting less restrictive alternatives."
LEAA STANDARD supra note 34, STANDARD 14.4: "[These provisions are designed to facilitate the
appellate review of dispositions (written findings of facts and reasons for particular disposition
chosen); and OJJAC STANDARD, FORMAL INTERVENTION, supra note 13, STANDARD 7.4.
145. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.17(D) provides either party can request a written
opinion setting forth reasons why less restrictive alternatives were not imposed.
146. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.14(D).
147. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.02(H): "Equal treatment under the law without regard to
race, religion, sex, or social status."
148. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 48 cites the Report of the Ohio Task Force for
the Implementation of the Equal Rights Amendment (1975) which showed that 60% of the females in
state juvenile institutions were status offenders.
149. OnIo TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 48 presents figures showing that 15% of the
females in one state institution were pregnant and had been committed as unruly children. There is
little doubt but that those who can afford private care and counseling avoid juvenile court involvement,
and only the poor are forced to rely on it foraid. Nothing could be more costly, stigmatizing and futile
than a commitment of these pregnant girls; and much less costly local services are available to handle
pregnancy.
150. The proposed sections relating to emancipation, H.B. 460,suora note 36, §§ 2151.70-74 are
not usually thought to address this issue. In any event they wereall deleted from Sub, H.B. 460 before
it was sent to the floor by the House Judiciary Committee. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS, RIOIITS OF
MINORS. supra note 35, STANDARD 2. I(CX2). The Standard explicitly limits the emancipation doctrine
to issues not addressed by other Standards within the volume.
151. See KONOPKA, THE ADOLESCENT GIRL IN CONFLICT (1966).
152. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.241 (Page Supp. 1977). This section permits the minor to
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conclude that withholding these services from minors has not and will not
deter sexual activity by the young. In effect, withholding these services
contributes to epidemic rates for venereal disease and teenage pregnancies.
Consequently, the Standards recommend shifting decision-making
power from parent to minor in these sexual problem areas. 53 A number
of states have enacted legislation allowing physicians to provide birth
control information and devices to minors without parental consent, S4 but
Ohio has not gone beyond a statute authorizing venereal disease treatment
without parental knowledge or consent.155
In addition to Subsection H,5 6 another provision of House Bill 460
eliminated the institutionalized preference for appointing female referees
to hear cases involving female children.1 57 Unfortunately, the Substitute
Bill is quite unclear on this point.
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4. Renewed Emphasis on the Family
Subsection I guarantees to each child "a healthful and supportive
home and the assistance of the state in effectuating this right." 5  This
provision implements the Code's express purpose of maintaining children
in a family environment and separating a child from his parents only when
consent to venereal disease tests and treatment, but absolves the parents of liability to pay for them.
The statute does not require the physician to notify the parent.
153. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS, RIGnTS oF MINORS, supra note 35, at70-71. STANDARD 4.8(A)
provides that any minor may consent to medical services for venereal disease, contraception and
pregnancy-, 4.8(B) permits the physician to forego notification unless failure to inform would seriously
jeopardize the health ofthe minor. Current cases deny the validity ofstatestatutes that givespousal or
parental veto powers over the abortion decision, but statutes which require written consent in some
cases may be valid. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976);
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132(1976). The LEAA Standards do not address the issues at all. LEAA
STANDARDS supra note 34, STANDARDS 11.14, 11.10, 11.11. LEAA STANDARD 11.1 calls forrespect for
parental autonomy;, STANDARD 11.4 mandates consideration of parental cultural values. The LEAA
STARNDARS consider health, education, housing and recreation programs, but they do not address
sexual problems unless one draws huge conclusions from a statement that appears in the commentary
to STANDARD 3.1 on health services. "Local programs should develop guidelines regarding those
medical problems that can be diagnosed and treated while maintaining a confidential relationship
between doctor and youngster." LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, STANDARD 3.1.
154. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10053.2 (West 1972); MD. CODE ANN. § 135 (1971), See IJA-
ABA STANDARDS, RIGHTS OF MINORS, supra note 35, at 74, 75.
155. See note 153 supra.
156. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.15 provides: "cases shall be submitted to referees without
regard to the sex or race of the child."
157. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. 2151.16 (Page 1976) specifically provides: "In appointing a referee
for the trial of females, a female referee shall be appointed wherepossible." H.B. 460,supra note36, §
2151.15 provides: "All referees appointed after June 1, 1977 shall be attorneys appointed to practicein
this state." IJA-ABA STANDARDS, COURT ORGANIZATION AND ADMiiNLSTRATION,supra note 35, at22
argues that use of referees demonstrates the lowered status of the courts. The National Advisory
Commission agrees, but the use of referees is approved and supported by the ABA STANDARDS OF
JuDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, COURT ORGANIZATION § 125 (Approved Draft 1974); OHIO TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 24, at 129 (approval of Attorney referees).
158. Sub H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.06(B) does provide that a judge "shall not appoint a
referee in any cases solely upon the basis of sex."
159. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.02(1).
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necessary for his welfare or to protect the public safety.160  Subsection I is
also consistent with provisions in House Bill 460 that preclude Youth
Commission commitment for status offenders,' 6' emphasize nonsecure
treatment programs, and impose severe limitations on the use of secure
treatment facilities for unruly children.162  Subsection I is supported by
the ban on the use of jails for detaining children,163 and the preference for
pre-adjudication release to parents. 64  Couple these changes with a
restricted Ohio Youth Commission population, 63 Youth Commission
authority to limit commitments, 66 reallocation of funds from Fairfield to
community treatment programs, 167 and increased reliance on foster and
168group homes, it becomes apparent why the Task Force placed renewed
emphasis on the home and on the assistance needed to strengthen the
home.
169
Many experts who testified explained that neither a change in the
Juvenile Code nor in institutional policy would reduce juvenile criminali-
ty. Most experts agreed that restricting juvenile court jurisdiction and
reducing Youth Commission commitments might diminish the adverse
impact these institutions have on the minor offender, but they reaffirmed
the idea of community support to strengthen the family as the best way to
decrease juvenile delinquency.1 0
5. Court Monitoring of Treatment Facilities
The Task Force sought not only to reduce unwarranted commitments
160. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (Page 1976): "(C) To achieve the foregoing purposes,
whenever possible, in a family environment, separating the child from its parents only when necessary
for his welfare or in the interests of public safety."
161. See notes 57-63 and accompanying text supra.
162. H.B. 460, supra note 36, §§ 2151.47(C), (E). Sub. H:B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151,27(E),
163. H.B. 460, supra note 36, §§ 2151.20(C), (G); Sub. H.B. 160, supra note 42, §§ 2151.13,
2151.15(C); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.312(A)(4) (Page 1976).
164. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.22(A); Sub. H.B. 460,supra note 42, §§ 2151.16(A), (D)(I).
165. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 5139.93(B); Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 5139.03(B),
166. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 5139.03(C); no such section appears in Sub. HB, 460.
167. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 5139.03(J): "Upon the closing of Fairfield, the Youth
Commission shall make available to local and regional youth services throughout the state funds
previously designated for the operation of Fairfield and shall devise a plan to assist in the employment
of persons previously employed at Fairfield." See also H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2152.02 which
mandates a "family home" atmosphere. No similar sections appear in Sub. H.B. 460.
168. In 1975, § 5139.06(B) of the Ohio Revised Code was repealed. It mandated minimum
institutional commitments of five months and was repealed to make possible direct placement of
committed children to foster homes. OHIO REy. CODE ANN. § 5139.06(B) (Page 1970) (repealed 1975),
Since 1975 the Ohio Youth Commission has certified approximately 300 foster homes as well as 24
groups homes. See Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.26 for an example of increased reliance on
foster homes.
169. LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, ch. 1, 2 & 3 relate to delinquency prevention. Family is
emphasized, as well as those services necessary to strengthen it. OJJAC STANDARDS, SUpra note 33,
relating to prevention start off with § 1 entitled "Family" IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL
MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 35, at STANDARD 4.1 recommends a sp-ctrum of services for families In
conflict.
170. See testimony of Mr. Jack McCormick, Superintendent of the Bureau of Criminal
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of children to Ohio Youth Commission institutions, but also to insure that
all commitments were based on an understanding of the nature of the
institution and its program of rehabilitation.17 1 Only a small percentage
of juvenile judges interviewed by the Task Force had ever visited any Ohio
Youth Commission institution or a private institution. Ohio Youth
Commission officials confirmed the Task Force sampling that few judges
were familiar with the institutions into which they regularly committed
children. Because the Task Force could not conceive of any justification
for a commitment to the very old, delapidated, Fairfield School for Boys
other than lack of knowledge of its condition, 72 the Task Force concluded
that it was essential to require all Ohio juvenile court judges to maintain
familiarity with the institutions to which they commit adjudicated child-
ren.173  Consequently, the proposed legislation specifically provides each
judge: (1) shall be familiar with the program and physical condition of any
institution; (2) shall visit every public care and treatment facility within his
county or district once each year; (3) shall visit every Youth Commission
institution every three years; and (4) shall file a written report citing specific
facts indicating an understanding of the facility's education, vocational
training, housing conditions, medical, dental, psychological and psychiat-
ric health care programs, and any other matter that might appear signifi-
cant to the judge. In addition, the report is to include recommendations
for improvements. 174 Proposed § 2151.1 I(B) also requires this reort be
filed with the Clerk of Courts and be made available to the public.
Identification and Investigation, Office of the Attorney General. See OnoTAsr FORCE REPoRTsupra
note 24, at 38.
171. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01(B) (Page 1976). This section appears in bothversions
of H.B. 460, and articulates the basic premise of a separate system for juveniles: to substitute for
punishment a program of supervision, care, and rehabilitation.
172. The individual juvenile judges to whom I have talked and the Ohio Association ofJuvenile
Court Judges take the position that the Ohio Youth Commission has been established to provide
treatment facilities and programs for all wards committed to it by the courts. They argue the state
agency may be underfunded or inadequately managed, but whether it treats children or not is the
problem of the state agency and of no concern to them. In view of the purpose clause, and the
treatment premise, this seems rather unconvincing. At page ten of their analysis appears their
philosophy:. "As a state agency, the responsibility lies with the Ohio Youth Commission to provide
adequate treatment facilities for all wards committed to it by the courts." See also UA-ABA
STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUs, supra note 35, STANDARD 3.6; LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34,
STANDARD 14.3.
173. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note42, § 2151.11 § 2151.3; OnOTAsK FoRCERrPORT, supra note24,
at 27.
174. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, MONITORING, supra note 35, STANDARD 1.6(BXI): "Method of
information gathering and documentation should include, but not necessarily be limited to: (b) on-site
visits, inspections, and observations, including the use of film or video-tape to record and document
conditions and activities . . ." LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 35, STANDARD 27.3 mandates a
monitoring program, but does not detail the responsibilities thereunder, it does say 1:"Establishing the
monitoring program recommended [here] would be a major achievement for the juvenile justice
system." OJJAC STANDARD, FORMAL INTERVENTION, supra note 33, STANDARD 6.7 mandates
institutional visitation.
175. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.1 l(B). See also IJA-ABA STANDARD, DIsPosrrloN,
supra note 35, STANDARD 1.2(G), which prohibits any coercive disposition, "unless the resources
necessary to carry out this disposition are shown to exist," and requires if the resources are not
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Once again, this reform is not a new idea. The Standards mandate
juvenile court monitoring of facilities to which judges assign children in
order to insure that proper care and treatment is provided.176 The
Standards require judges to file reports to effect necessary changes. 177
These reports would substantiate the monitoring functions to be fulfilled
by juvenile court judges. To help the court fulfill its responsibility to
monitor the institutions and facilities to which they commit juveniles, the
legislation also provides that the court may demand reports from these
institutions.1
78
6. Appellate Monitoring of Juvenile Courts:
Stay of Court Orders
The proposed requirement that courts maintain verbatim records of
their proceedings 79 and other judicial reporting requirements relative to
case disposition will aid in the process of allowing the appellate process to
monitor juvenile courts. 180  This author feels the proposed Code might
have more carefully addressed the reviewability issue even though the
available, "an alternative disposition no more severe . . ."; STANDARD 4.1(D) requires the
correctional agency or allows any interested party to inform the sentencing court of any deficiency, and
requires the court to go so far as to discharge the youth if needed services are not made available to him,
LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, STANDARD 14.20 protects the adjiudicated juvenile's right to all
publicly funded services to which nonadjudicated juveniles have access and this section mandates
modification of any dispositional order when it appears that access to required services are not being
provided.
176. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 35, STANDARD 3.6:
The attainment of a fair and efffctive system ofjuvenilejustice requires that everyjurisdiction
should, by legislation, couft' decision, appropriations, and methods of administration,
provide services and facilities adequate to carry out the principles underlying these standards.
Accordingly, the absence of funds cannot be a justification for resources or procedures that
fall below the standards or unnecessarily infringe on individual liberty. Accused juveniles
should be released or placed under less restrictive control whenever a form of detention or
control otherwise appropriate is unavailable to the decision maker.
Accord LEAA STANDARD, supra note 34, STANDARD 14.3.
177. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, MONITORING, supra note 35, STANDARD 9.1 articulates court
responsibility for the monitoring of matters affecting juvenile justice. STANDARD 9.2 speaks of the
court's traditional rule making power relative to its orders and further provides:
B. Juvenile court judges should further continuously monitor the facilities to which
they assign juveniles, including making periodic on-site inspections, to determine that proper
care and treatment is being provided. Judges should not only keep informed ofthe condition
in the facilities but also should make reports to effect change when needed.
178. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.08(B).
179. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.14(D) would seem to permit continued use of
recording devices. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.14(B) provides: "The juvenile court shall keep
verbatim records of all proceedings as in courts of common pleas." See IJA-ABA STANDARDS,
ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 35, STANDARD 2.1(A), LEAA STANDARD, supra note 34, STANDARD
11.7 (Encouraging accountability); OJJAC STANDARDS, FORMAL INTERVENTION, supra note 3,
STANDARD 6.2. Juv. R. 37 provides: "[A] complete record of all testimony, or other oral proceedings
shall be taken in shorthand, stenotype or by any other adequate mechanical or electronic recoding
device." It is common practice, in Cuyahoga County, to deny motions requesting a shorthand
reporter even though there is no recorded instances of the correct and adequate operation of their
recording devices.
180. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, MONITORING, supra note 35, STANDARD 9.3; IJA-ABA STANDARDS,
APPEALS AND COLLATERAL REVIEW, supra note 35, STANDARD 2.1; STANDARD 2.1 provides: "It is the
intent of these standards that review of right may be had of the merits of the dispositional order."
OJJAC STANDARDS, PLANNING, supra note 33, at 4. LEAA STANDARD, supra note 34, STANDARD
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pending legislation is no worse than existing law.!"1 The current law and
practice of most juvenile and appellate courts is to refuse to stay execution
of the juvenile court order on appeal. This presents a serious impediment
to appeal not only in this state, but also across the nation. Although the
Standards might be correct in questioning the wisdom of an automatic
stay, the Standards are certainly correct in stating that a stay should
ordinarily be favored and a denial supported by specific reasons entered
upon the record.1
82
7. Time Limits on Hearings
The proposed Code continues the present preference for immediate
return of arrested juveniles to their parents wherever possible.'83  The
Code seems to eliminate the possibility that a dependent child will either be
housed or confined with unruly or delinquent children. 84  In addition,
whenever a child is taken into custody and detention is recommended, it is
important to hold a detention hearing as soon as possible. Present rules
require a hearing on the next court day, or within seventy-two hours."5
While the original Bill required only that the hearing be within seventy-
two hours, 8 6 the Substitute Bill corrected this deficiency. 8
7
13.8 emphasizes the fundamental nature ofappeal to correct trial court errors in individual cases and to
facilitate consistent interpretations and uniform application of law throughout the jurisdiction.
LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, STANDARD 12.3 guarantees: "8. The, right to the keeping of a
verbatim record of the proceedings." It concludes however, with a qualified approval of electronic
recording systems.
181. See In re Becker, 39 Ohio St. 2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974).
182. IA-ABA STANDARDS, APPEALS AND COLLATERAL REVIEW, supra note 35,STANDARDS 5.I,
5.2,5.3. LEAA STANDARD, supra note 34, STANDARD 14.8 suggests that the record is essential and that
appellate review should be facilitated. STANDARD 20.6 protects review of disciplinary orders but no
thought was given to the adverse impact the current nonstay policy has when coupled with long
appellate court delay. Mostjuveniles represented by me believed an appeal would lengthen their time
of commitment, and many were unwilling to risk appeal for that reason alone. OJJAC recognized the
desirability of monitoring, but did not consider the impact the appellate process might have, Sub.
H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2505.17 continues the existing preference for nonstay, and prohibits stay
unless it is approved by the juvenile court-the court that has just found it necessary.
183. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.16. Present Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.311(A)
(Page 1976) provides: "[a] person taking a child into custody shall, with all reasonable speed . . . (I)
release the child to his parents . . ." The original section enacted in 1969 also included the words
"and without first taking the child elsewhere." These words were included to prevent the police
practice of taking the juvenile to the police station for the usual four hour"booking" processwith all its
intimidating effect. They were eliminated in 1972; and for no good reason. IA-ABA STANDARDS,
INTERIM STATUS, supra note 35, STANDARD 5.4 provides: "The holding of an arrested juvenile in any
police detention facility prior to release or transportation to ajuvenile facility should be prohibited."
184. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.312(B) (Page 1976) permits confinement of neglected or
dependent children with delinquents upon order of the court. See Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42. §
2151.26 that specifically prohibits commingling as to dependent children but allows commingling of
unruly and delinquent children. HA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MnSBEnIAVIOR,supra note 35,
STANDARD 5.2 specifically prohibits commingling. OJJAC STANDARDS, FORMAL INTER V TioN,
supra note 33, STANDARD 4.1 limits use of detention to delinquents. But see STANDARD 4.13 that
contemplates their use for status offenders but labels it the least desirable placement alternative.
185. Juv. R. 7(F)(1): "[Not later than seventy-two hours, after a child is placed in detention or
shelter care, or the next court day, whichever is earlier . . .
186. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.23(A). Butsee H.B.460,supranote36,§2151.35,3151.45,
which specify next day hearings.
187. Sub. H.B. 460, § 2151.16(F).
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Along with prosecutorial involvement, the original Bill remains
consistent with the Standards'"8 by providing that alleged delinquent
children must be arraigned within seventy-two hours; the Substitute Bill
requires a similar hearing.' 89 The function of this arrangement is to
inform the juvenile of the charge against him and to make sure he knows
and understands his basic rights. The proposed Ohio Code requires the
adjudicatory hearing be held within ten days.9 0 The Standards, however,
would require a probable cause hearing in cases where the adjudicatory
hearing for a detained juvenile is not held within five days.' 9' Ohio
currently requires the adjudicatory hearing be held within ten days and no
provision provides 92 for a probable cause hearing.
8. Open Juvenile Court Hearings
One of the most important changes within House Bill 460 is the
rejection of the closed juvenile court concept and the acceptance of the idea
of open court justice, whether it is ajuvenile or adult court.'93 This notion
188. LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, STANDARD 12.4 require.; an arraignment promptly after
a delinquency petition is filed. For juveniles in custody, this should be at the detention hearing.
STANDARD 12.11 requires that detention hearings be held no later than 48 hours after the juvenile has
been taken into custody. Forjuveniles who are not detained, the arraignment should be held within 72
hours. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, STANDARD 2.2, requires
the initial appearance as promptly as possible and in no case later than five days after the petition is
filed. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 35, at 13 suggests time limits: (1) STANDARD
5.3, release within two hours of arrest or transportation to a juvenile detention facility; (2) STANDARD
6.5, release or petition for detention within 24 hours; (3) STANDARD 7.6, detention hearing within 24
hours after petition is filed; and (4) STANDARD 7.10, adjudication within 15 days of arrest in eases where
the juvenile is detained for over 24 hours following a court order of detention.
189. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.23(C); Sub. H.B. 460, suvra note 42, § 2151.17(B).
190. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.23(B). Sub. H.B. 460, supra note42, § 2151.17(A) requires
adjudicatory hearing no later than ten days after the filing of the complaint, but allows the court to
continue it for an additional ten days.
191. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, STANDARD 4.1:
A. In all delinquency proceedings the respondent should have the right to a judicial
determination of probable cause, unless the adjudicatory hearing is [sic] held within [five]
days after the filing of the petition if the juvenile is detained, and within [fifteen] days if the
juvenile is not detained. Unless it appears from the evidence that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the respondent committed it, the petition
should be dismissed. B. Unless there has been a prior judicial determination of probable
cause, detention and transfer hearings should commence with consideration of that issue.
hearing shall be held not later than ten days after the filing of the complaint; upon a showing of good
cause the adjudicatory hearing may be continued and detention or shelter care extended." LEAA
STANDARD, supra note 34, STANDARD 12.1 requires, for juveniles in detention, "a. From admission to
detention or shelter care to filing of petition, arraignment, detention, or shelter care hearing and
probable cause hearing: 48 hours. b. From arraignment hearing to adjudicatory hearing: 20 calendar
days." Even a very busy county like Cuyahoga has had no trouble scheduling adjudicatory hearings
within ten days. No longer time should be allowed.
193. OHIo TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 28, 124. Juv. R. 27 presently gives thejudge
the option of opening the court, andthe Task Force heard evidence that some Ohio Juvenile courts had
been open for years without any bad effects on the juvenile. Consequently, a move to open courts can
do nothing but expose judicial impropriety. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 35,
STANDARD 6.1. Confidentiality is one of the many promises of the juvenile court that has not been
kept, and on retrospect, was never as important as the benefits derivable from public trials. See ]n re
OHIO JUVENILE CODE
of an open juvenile court has been described as a "clear betrayal of the
juvenile court philosophy."1 94 To those who have studied juvenile law and
practiced injuvenile courts, the change is only for the good. 95 None of the
adverse effects often mentioned occur in courts that are presently open,"
96
and the possibility of eliminating abusive judicial practices makes the
move worthwhile. One must remember that Justice Brennan said in
McKeiver that openness protects the accused from possible oppression by
exposing improper judicial behavior.197
Despite its advantages, the proposed section mandating open pro-
ceedings is less complete than provisions recommended by the Standards.
The Standards restrict the open or closed court decision to the juvenile,
while the present Ohio Code allows juveniles to waive an open hearing, but
also allows the prosecutor and the court to exclude the public. 98 This
author advocates the incorporation of the restrictive position of the
Standards into the Ohio legislation before its enactment.
9. Bail in Juvenile Courts
The proposed Bill retains existing rules and procedures relative to
detention or release.199 The original House Bill added the possibility of
bail.2 c The Standards prohibit the use of money bail because it would
incorporate bail abuses of the criminal court system into juvenile court;
this appeared incompatible with the noncriminal, nonpunitive philosophy
of the juvenile court.20' Although release policies have been regarded as
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). LEAA STANDARDS, supra note 34, STANDARD 12.3: "Court procedures in
delinquency cases prior to adjudication should conform to due process requirements. Except for the
right to bail, grand jury indictment, and trial by jury, the juvenile should have all the procedural rights
given a criminal defendant." Specifically, mentioned: "Upon request by the juvenile, a proceeding
open to the public, or with the court's permission, to specified members of the public." OJJAC
STANDARD, supra note 33, STANDARD 6.2: "[Alt the adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile shall be
afforded all the rights given a defendant in an adult criminal prosecution including trial by jury."
STANDARD 6.2(d) qualifies this: "The juvenile court should encourage openness in the official court
hearings but shall exclude thosewhom thejudge fears may threaten the child's right to confidentiality."
194. Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Jumenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. Rav.281,286(1967).
195. HIA-ABA STANDARDS, ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 35, STANDARD 6.1.
196. Franklin County Courts have been open to the press for approximately five years.
197. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). See HA-ABA STANDARDS,
ADJUDICATION, supra note 35, at 72.
198. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.14:
The juvenile court may conduct its hearings in an informal manner and may adjourn its
hearings in accordance with the time provisions set forth in division (F) of section 2151.16
and section 2151.17 of the Revised Code. All hearings in the court shall be open to the
general public, except that the court may, upon the motion of either party or upon its own
motion, exclude the general public and restrict admission to only persons who have a direct
interest in the case if the interests of the child would be best served by a closed hearing. The
court shall enter upon the record its reasons for restricting the general public from any
hearing."
199. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.55(B).
200. Sub. H.B. supra note 42, § 2151.16; H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.55(C).
201. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATus, supra note 35, STANDARD 4.7. LEAA
STANDARDS, supra note 34, STANDARD 12.12.
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an adequate substitute for bail, several cases and commentators have
concluded that bail cannot be denied to juveniles accused of criminal
acts.20 2 The drafting committee of the Task Force viewed bail as an
additional way to avoid unwarranted detention and, hence, justifiable. 20 3
It is entirely possible, however, that bail could be used as a substitute for
customary release procedures. Since juvenile adjudicatory hearings must
ordinarily be held within ten days, it is this author's position that present
juvenile court release standards and procedures are adequate to satisfy
constitutional needs. Bail is extremely susceptible to abuse and therefore
should not be included in the proposed legislation. Bail, fortunately, does
not appear in the Substitute Bill.
10. Juvenile Record in Sentencing After Waiver
The proposed relinquishment section 20 that allows waiver to criminal
courts is similar to the present Juvenile Code section203 and juvenile
Rule.20 6 The pending legislation does include directions to the criminal
court, however, to consider the child's juvenile record for sentencing.2 7
This provision resulted from testimony that many criminal court trial
judges apply first-offender standards, even though the youth may have an
extensive and violent juvenile record.
III. SUMMARY
In large measure, the changes incorporated within House Bill 460
eliminate present inadequacies of the juvenile justice system. The current
trend is to restrict juvenile court jurisdiction in order to mitigate the
adverse impact that institutionally oriented systems have on misbehaving
juveniles. House Bill 460 eliminated Ohio Youth Commission institution-
alization of status offenders, mandated creation of a Youth Commission
staff training program, established ceilings on institutional size, provided
for the closure of Fairfield, and established maximum terms for commit-
ment. The proposed legislation limits the length of time a court can retain
jurisdiction on the basis of an individual offense and established minimum
age levels for commitment. It eliminated use of jails for detention and
treatment, restricted jurisdiction over status offenders, extended juvenile
court jurisdiction over parents and families needing social services,
202. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 35, at 63-66. The commentary
marshalls over two pages of cases, articles and arguments in favor of and opposed to the use of ball in
juvenile courts.
203. Id. at 63. See also M. ROSENHEIM, "DETENTION FACILITIItS AND TEMPORARY SIIELTIRS,"
CHILD CARING: SOCIAL POLICY FOR THE INSTITUTION 280 (Pappenfort, ed. 1973); Boches, Juvenile
Justice in California: A Re-evaluation, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 47 (1967).
204. H.B. 460, supra note 36, § 2151.56; Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.29.
205. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page 1976).
206. Juv. R. 30.
207. Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 42, § 2151.29(F)(2).
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allowed early emancipation of mature and self-sufficient juveniles, called
for increased use of community facilities and programs, gave the Youth
Commission authority to promulgate minimum standards, and provided
the Youth Commission with the authority to allocate resources away from
state institutional programs and to community treatment programs.
House Bill 460 contained Ohio's first statutory basis for intake and
diversion and mandated prosecutorial involvement in these decisions. It
articulated the least restrictive alternative premise and implemented this
by requiring written judicial opinions explaining dispositional decisions.
It mandated an end to discrimination in the commitment of unruly
females, but did not address the harder issues of medical care, information
and decision making relative to contraception and pregnancy services.
The proposed Bill provided for monitoring treatment institutions and
facilities by juvenile court judges, allowed the public to monitor the
juvenile court's fulfillment of this function, and called for increased
monitoring of juvenile courts by appellate courts.
The Bill prevented commingling of noncriminal offenders with those
who have committed more serious offenses, involved the prosecutor in
juvenile justice to a greater degree by requiring information and arraign-
ment, provided for bail in certain situations and mandated juvenile records
in waiver cases. It opened up juvenile court hearings and process to public
scrutiny; nothing could be more conducive to improved juvenile justice.
Although the House Judiciary Committee modified many sections,
the result, Amended Substitute House Bill No. 460, is a measurable
improvement over present law. It is this author's opinion that the original
provisions awarding juvenile court jurisdiction over parents subject to
compulsory child rearing assistance and the provisions giving the court
jurisdiction to decree emancipation for mature and responsible juveniles
should be reconsidered. It must be remembered, however, that these
issues can be considered on another day. The proposed legislation should
not be jeopardized by attempting to reinstate these two proposals.
The Substitute Bill does not increase the prosecutor's role in the
intake and diversion functions as did the original Bill, but it allows
improved monitoring by the public of courts and treatment institutions.
This increased monitoring may be its most important contribution to
improved juvenilejustice. This author hopes, however, the legislation will
be changed to clarify whether juveniles alone are to decide if the juvenile
court is to be open to the public.
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